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QUALIFIED  IMMUNITY  AT  TRIAL
Alexander A. Reinert*
Qualified immunity doctrine is complex and important, and for many years it was assumed
to have an outsize impact on civil rights cases by imposing significant barriers to success for
plaintiffs.  Recent empirical work has cast that assumption into doubt, at least as to the impact
qualified immunity has at pretrial stages of litigation.  This Essay adds to this empirical work by
evaluating the impact of qualified immunity at trial, a subject that to date has not been empiri-
cally tested.  The results reported here suggest that juries are rarely asked to answer questions that
bear on the qualified immunity defense.  At the same time, the data illustrate that qualified
immunity can be a powerful barrier to plaintiffs’ success in the rare instances in which it is
presented to a jury.
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INTRODUCTION
  Qualified immunity is a powerful doctrine that can, in certain contexts,
operate to displace a damages remedy even where a plaintiff can establish
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that her constitutional rights were violated.  Academic literature has focused
on many different aspects of the immunity defense, from broad views such as
whether the current doctrine is faithful to its common-law roots to concrete
consideration of how to resolve some of the intricacies in the doctrine’s
application.1  In the backdrop, however, is the longstanding assumption that
qualified immunity has a significant impact on the resolution of litigated
cases.2  For many years, however, that assumption was not subjected to empir-
ical scrutiny.3
Recent empirical work has undermined some of these assumptions.  In
the area of Bivens litigation,4 for example, I have presented data that suggest
that qualified immunity rarely, if ever, has an impact on litigated Bivens
cases.5  And Joanna Schwartz’s recent work suggests that the same may be
said for the parallel area of Section 1983 litigation, at least in cases brought
for alleged Fourth Amendment violations.6
Even as recent scholarship has raised questions about the perceived wis-
dom concerning the impact of the qualified immunity defense overall, the
recent empirical literature has not addressed an important area: the rele-
vance that the qualified immunity defense plays at trial.  Indeed, until this
Essay, there has been no systematic empirical study of how qualified immu-
nity is raised and resolved at trial.
Although the number of trials in both state and federal courts has signif-
icantly declined over the past several decades,7 studying the role of qualified
1 A comprehensive discussion of qualified immunity scholarship would test the
patience of even the most devoted reader.  By way of illustration, Westlaw reports that as of
February 28, 2018, since 1980 there are 334 law review articles with the words “qualified
immunity” in the title.  This is surely an underestimate of the articles devoting substantial
discussion to the doctrine—Westlaw reports that there are at least 1395 law review articles
in which the phrase “qualified immunity” is used ten times or more over the same time
period.
2 For a discussion of this literature, see generally Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified
Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 6–7 (2017).  I have also written about how the doctrine
might impact whether a case is even filed in court, Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified
Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477 (2011), but this has not been the focus of other
scholars’ attention.
3 See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 8.
4 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
the Supreme Court held that federal agents acting under color of federal law may be
found liable for monetary damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 389.
Bivens claims are similar to Section 1983 claims against state officials, but much more lim-
ited in scope. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  See generally Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N.
Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1473
(2013).
5 Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for
the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 843 (2010) (reporting that qualified
immunity was the basis for dismissal in five out of 244 Bivens complaints identified).
6 See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 10 (reporting that “just 3.9% of the cases in which
qualified immunity could be raised were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds”).
7 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Mat-
ters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 464 fig.1 (2004) (showing
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immunity at trial is important for many reasons.  First, as with the role of
qualified immunity in general, the literature abounds with untested assump-
tions about the work done by qualified immunity at trial.  For some scholars,
it is obvious that the defense should rarely if ever play a role at trial,8 whereas
for others it is assumed that it will have a powerful impact on jury delibera-
tions.9  Second, Supreme Court doctrine regarding qualified immunity
assumes that there will be a role for qualified immunity at trial, but has not
elaborated on when and how that should happen.10  Examining how and
when trial courts instruct juries on qualified immunity helps to understand
how ambiguous Supreme Court doctrine operates at the trial court level.
Third, examining trials is perhaps the best way of understanding how lower
courts have resolved the disputed status of qualified immunity as an affirma-
tive defense.11  Upon whom, and for what issues, have courts placed the bur-
dens of production, proof, and persuasion?  Finally, if, as many observers
that the number of civil trials across all U.S. district courts dropped from more than 12,000
in the 1980s to fewer than 5000 in 2002); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials
Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of
Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 713 tbl.1 (2004) (presenting trial statis-
tics from 1970 through 2000).
8 See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Constitutional Decision Rules for Juries, 37 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 659, 712–13 (2006) (taking position that jury should not decide qualified
immunity, but leaving open role for jury in deciding issues of fact relevant to immunity);
Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immunity in Section
1983 Actions for a Police Officer’s Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 68 (1989) (argu-
ing, pre-Saucier, that the reasonableness inquiry in excessive force cases overlaps with quali-
fied immunity inquiry, making qualified immunity inapplicable and raising concerns about
jury confusion otherwise).
9 See, e.g., Kenneth Duvall, Burdens of Proof and Qualified Immunity, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J.
135, 158 (2012) (noting that “many, if not most, qualified immunity claims have to go to
trial because of fact-intensive issues,” but providing no data); Martin A. Schwartz, Funda-
mentals of Section 1983 Litigation, 17 TOURO L. REV. 525, 547 (2001) (describing qualified
immunity as “potent” defense at trial).
10 Indeed, as discussed below, the Supreme Court has rarely taken cases to address
trial-related issues related to qualified immunity. See infra Section I.B.
11 Several articles have addressed how burdens should be allocated in resolving quali-
fied immunity, but most have not specifically focused on how burdens should be allocated
at trial. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the
Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 68–98 (1997) (addressing bur-
dens of production, proof, and persuasion at summary judgment stage); Duvall, supra note
9, at 166 (arguing that defendant should bear burden at all stages, including trial); Kit
Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV.
597, 634–42 (1989) (reviewing Supreme Court and lower court decisions regarding bur-
dens of proof for qualified immunity in general); cf. Struve, supra note 8, at 710–13 (sug-
gesting that juries should only resolve factual issues that bear on qualified immunity, but
not addressing burden of persuasion on those issues).  One exception in the literature
focuses more specifically on burdens at trial and argues that where questions of fact are
relevant to the outcome of qualified immunity determinations, allocating the burdens of
proof and persuasion to the defendant at trial is the fairest outcome. See Teressa E.
Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look Beyond Summary Judgment When
Resolving § 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VILL. L. REV. 135, 167–84 (2007).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL509.txt unknown Seq: 4 18-JUL-18 7:12
2068 notre dame law review [vol. 93:5
assume, qualified immunity puts a substantial burden on plaintiffs seeking to
remedy their rights, looking to trial outcomes is one means to test this
hypothesis.
In this Essay, I present data reflecting how qualified immunity func-
tioned at trials that took place during a three-and-a-half-year period in all
federal district courts (beginning in mid-2012 through the end of 2015).
The data may be surprising to some.  First, they show that juries are rarely
instructed on qualified immunity, nor are they routinely asked to resolve dis-
puted factual questions that might bear on application of the defense.  In
more than eighty-five percent of civil rights trials in which qualified immunity
had been raised at some point in the case, district courts gave no instruction
on qualified immunity.  Second, when they do instruct on qualified immunity
or ask jurors to resolve disputed factual questions that bear on the immunity
defense, lower courts are not attentive to issues related to the burdens of
proof, production, and persuasion.  Where lower courts allocate burdens,
they are more likely to allocate it to the plaintiff, but in general lower courts
neglect to even address burdens when they instruct juries on issues related to
qualified immunity.  Third, when juries are instructed on qualified immunity,
plaintiffs are much less likely to prevail at trial.  Indeed, plaintiffs’ win rate
nearly tripled in cases that went to verdict where the jury was not given a
qualified immunity instruction, as compared to cases in which the jury was
given such an instruction.  This is the case even though there is little evi-
dence that juries ever reach qualified immunity issues in deliberation.
These findings have significant implications, which I discuss toward the
end of this Essay.  Do jury trials rarely address qualified immunity because,
despite the abstract guidance provided by the Supreme Court in cases like
Saucier v. Katz,12 parties and district courts simply cannot discern a line
between an officer who violates the Constitution and an officer who acts rea-
sonably in so doing?  Are courts treating qualified immunity solely as an
immunity from suit and not also a defense to liability, again despite contrary
language from the Supreme Court?  Or are most cases in which qualified
immunity is raised ones in which the principal dispute between the parties
consists of the meaning of “clearly established” law and not the reasonable-
ness of the defendant’s conduct?  These are just some of the questions raised
by these findings.
The Essay proceeds as follows.  In Part I, I review the basic outlines of
qualified immunity doctrine, with which I assume most readers of this vol-
ume will be familiar, pausing to focus more directly on two issues that have
confounded lower courts: (1) when and how qualified immunity may be
raised at trial; and (2) upon whom burdens of production, proof, and persua-
sion should rest.  In Part II, I briefly describe my empirical methodology, and
in Part III I present the results of my study.  In Part IV, I discuss the implica-
tions of these results and avenues for future research.  I then offer a brief
conclusion.
12 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AT TRIAL: DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE
A. Qualified Immunity Policy and Procedure
The qualified immunity defense was first refined by the Supreme Court
in the Bivens context13 to permit public officials to escape liability for uncon-
stitutional conduct where the law governing their conduct was unclear at the
time of the violation or where they behaved objectively reasonably, even if
unconstitutionally, in light of the clearly established law.14  If an official can
establish either of these elements,15 then she is immune from damages liabil-
ity.  The Court has crafted the immunity defense to balance the tension
between providing citizens with a remedy for constitutional violations, while
recognizing that “claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the
guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a
whole.”16
The goal of modern qualified immunity doctrine is to provide courts
with a means for dismissing claims early on in the life cycle of a case, thus
shielding defendants from the burdens of discovery, let alone trial.  This is
reflected in several aspects of the doctrine.  First, in the seminal decision
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court instructed lower courts to base resolution of
the defense on the “objective reasonableness” of the defendant’s conduct in
light of clearly established law, not the then-prevailing good-faith standard.17
The Court viewed the latter standard, with its emphasis on the subjective
intentions of the defendant, as insufficiently protective because of the abili-
ties of “ingenious plaintiff’s counsel” to create material issues of fact based on
little evidence.18  Thus, moving to an “objective reasonableness” standard was
viewed as necessary to “permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment.”19
Second, because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit and not
just a defense to liability, defendants who assert the defense are entitled to
many procedural protections.  Qualified immunity can be raised at any time:
at the motion to dismiss stage, after limited or full discovery through sum-
mary judgment, or at trial.20  A defendant need not raise it at any particular
13 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
14 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986).
15 Qualified immunity has been described as an affirmative defense, see Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980), but as discussed below, not every circuit consistently
allocates to the defendant the burdens of establishing the defense.
16 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
17 Id. at 818.
18 Id. at 817 n.29 (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Gesell, J., concurring)).
19 Id. at 818.
20 See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306–07 (1996); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985).
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time to preserve it for trial and may raise it as many times as she wishes.21
Defendants may be able to seek protection from discovery until the threshold
legal question of qualified immunity is resolved.22  They may pursue multiple
interlocutory appeals of otherwise unappealable denials of motions to dismiss
or summary judgment, so long as their appeal is confined to law-based quali-
fied immunity arguments.23  This exception to the final judgment rule is jus-
tified as one more tool for public officials to terminate insubstantial suits
promptly.24
B. Qualified Immunity Burdens: The Doctrinal Void
The Court thus has directed lower court judges to resolve qualified
immunity, if possible, prior to trial, for the value of the immunity is “effec-
tively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”25  As such, we
should not be surprised that the Court has focused on qualified immunity
decisions made at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stage, and
not on how the immunity defense is resolved at trial.  Of the scores of quali-
fied immunity cases that the Supreme Court has decided26 since it created
the modern version of the defense in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, only a handful of
opinions reviewed a case at which a jury trial transpired—every other case
reviewed a decision on a motion for summary judgment or to dismiss.27  Two
of the cases that reviewed a jury trial did not address trial-related issues, but
rather the relevant law that governed application of the defense.28  The third
case—Ortiz v. Jordan—addressed whether a defendant who unsuccessfully
moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds could appeal
that denial after a jury trial had concluded.  The Court held that such an
21 This is the implication of Behrens and Mitchell, which permit interlocutory appeal of
denials of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages with-
out regard for how many times a defendant has raised the defense.
22 See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
23 See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 307–09; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–27.
24 See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306.
25 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).
26 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 82 (2018)
(identifying thirty cases that addressed the substance of the immunity rather than procedu-
ral issues).
27 See Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (reviewing judgment on jury ver-
dict); Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 183 (2011) (addressing appealability of summary judg-
ment denial after conclusion of jury trial); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986)
(reviewing First Circuit’s reversal of directed verdict).  In one case heard by the Court, the
plaintiff had been granted relief after a bench trial. See Scherer v. Davis, 543 F. Supp. 4
(N.D. Fla. 1981), aff’d sub nom. Scherer v. Graham, 710 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub
nom. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
28 See Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 350 (concluding that there was no “clearly established” law
that put the defendant on notice that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment); Malley,
475 U.S. at 346 (holding that officer was not entitled to qualified immunity simply because
a judge found probable cause supported warrant application).
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appeal was not available, because once trial had occurred any entitlement to
qualified immunity had to be resolved by reference to the trial record.29
Because the Court has highlighted the need to resolve qualified immu-
nity early and often, it has provided very little guidance for how trial courts
should, if at all, involve the jury in decisions regarding qualified immunity
decisionmaking.  It has not, for instance, clarified the burdens of production,
proof, or persuasion for establishing the defense, although it has referred to
it as an affirmative defense and allocated to the defense the burden of plead-
ing.30  Lower courts, accordingly, have taken varied approaches to what qual-
ified immunity’s status as an affirmative defense means.
Understanding how lower courts have treated the burdens of establish-
ing qualified immunity is a challenge, in part because some courts have at
times announced conflicting standards.31  In addition, it is worth noting that
the caselaw I discuss in this section, like the Supreme Court caselaw, does not
usually arise in the context of a trial, but rather in appeals of district court
decisions on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.  With
that caveat, at one extreme are the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, which have
stated that the plaintiff has the burden of proof in qualified immunity
cases.32  On the other end are the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits, which place the burden of both pleading and proving an entitle-
ment to qualified immunity on the defendant.33
In between these extremes are the circuits that have adopted burden-
shifting frameworks.  In the Sixth Circuit, once the defendant raises qualified
immunity as a defense, the plaintiff must show that the relevant right is
clearly established, although the defendant carries the burden of showing
that the challenged act was objectively reasonable in light of the law existing
29 Ortiz, 562 U.S. at 190–91.
30 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
31 See, e.g., Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 378 n.4 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting division
within Fourth Circuit as to burden of persuasion); Duvall, supra note 9, at 144 n.48, 145
n.50 (noting intracircuit conflicts on issue in Fourth and Ninth Circuits).
32 See, e.g., Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Once a defen-
dant has raised qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the heavy
two-part burden of demonstrating that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right
and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged con-
duct.”); Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Although the privilege of
qualified immunity is a defense, the plaintiff carries the burden of defeating it.”); see also
Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that at trial, the
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion “to overcome qualified immunity by showing a
violation of clearly established federal law”); Poolaw v. Marcantel, 565 F.3d 721, 728 (10th
Cir. 2009).
33 See, e.g., Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011); Henry v.
Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2007); Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir.
2005); DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001); Blissett v. Coughlin, 66
F.3d 531, 539 (2d Cir. 1995).
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at the time.34  In the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, once the defendant shows
he was acting within his discretionary authority at the time of the alleged
unlawful conduct or that he acted in good faith, the burden of proof
“shifts . . . to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to quali-
fied immunity.”35  In the Eighth Circuit, the defendant bears the burden of
proof on all elements of the defense, except the plaintiff must show that the
relevant law was clearly established.36  Other commentators have come to
similar conclusions regarding this split of authority.37
On the concrete issue of burdens of proof and qualified immunity, then,
the Supreme Court has left a doctrinal void that lower courts have struggled
to fill.  The confusion does not abate when one considers the related ques-
tion of whether, and how, qualified immunity should be raised at trial, a sub-
ject I take up next.
C. Qualified Immunity at Trial: Unanswered Questions
As discussed above, courts of appeals have paid some attention to how to
allocate burdens of production, proof, and persuasion in resolving qualified
immunity issues in general, but they have devoted less attention to the issue
at trial.  Many courts have, for example, referenced the availability of special
interrogatories to resolve factual disputes relevant to qualified immunity, but
have not necessarily done so while attentive to burdens of proof or persua-
sion.38  These courts have also suggested that the issue of qualified immunity
34 Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Baker v. City of Hamilton,
471 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2006); Barrett v. Steubenville City Sch., 388 F.3d 967, 970 (6th
Cir. 2004); Tucker v. City of Richmond, 388 F.3d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 2004)).
35 Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Bates v. Harvey, 518
F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that after defendant establishes that he was
acting pursuant to authority, plaintiff must show that qualified immunity is not appropriate
because “under the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time, his actions
violated clearly established law”); Breen v. Tex. A&M Univ., 485 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir.
2007) (“When a defendant invokes qualified immunity . . . the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to rebut the applicability of the defense.”); see also Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cty., 246
F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001); Reinert, supra note 2, at 487 n.65.
36 See Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007).
37 Duvall, supra note 9, at 142–45 (“To sum up the qualified immunity tally: on the
one side are the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, placing the bur-
dens of proof for both major steps on the defendant; on the other side are the Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, placing the burdens of proof for both major steps
on the plaintiff; and in between are the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, splitting the burdens
by step, but differently from each other.”).
38 See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 704 n.7 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(“Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity may depend in large part on
factual determinations the jury will be required to make.”); Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d
578, 585 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Where, as in this case, factual questions prevent a district court
from ruling on the issue of qualified immunity, it is appropriate to tailor special interroga-
tories specific to the facts of the case.  This practice allows the jury to make any requisite
factual findings that the district court may then rely upon to make its own qualified immu-
nity ruling.”); Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that,
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should be ultimately decided by the court, with juries limited to resolving
disputed factual issues.39  At least one circuit has expressed openness to
instructing the jury on the defense and permitting the jury to resolve it at
trial.40
But courts have generally neglected to attend to the question—if quali-
fied immunity is to be decided by the jury, either through application of
clearly established law or by resolving disputed factual questions—upon
whom burdens of proof and persuasion lie.  For example, if the defendant
contends that certain facts entitled her to qualified immunity, must she estab-
lish the existence of those facts by a preponderance of the evidence or must
the plaintiff establish that the facts did not exist?
Guidance from the circuit courts regarding jury instructions does not
clarify matters.  Many circuits provide model jury instructions, but these do
not generally address burdens of proof or persuasion on qualified immunity
issues.  The First Circuit does not provide pattern instructions for qualified
immunity, but notes that it recognizes that courts might ask a jury to resolve
factual questions relevant to the immunity defense.41  The Second Circuit
does not have pattern jury instructions, but has approved of courts using spe-
cial interrogatories to resolve disputed factual questions for qualified immu-
nity.42  The Third Circuit’s model instructions do not approve of instructing
because it is an affirmative defense, defendant had burden of requesting that the jury be
charged on particular questions relevant to qualified immunity, but not addressing bur-
dens of proof or persuasion on the issue); Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2002) (“A tool used to apportion the jury and court functions relating to qualified
immunity issues in cases that go to trial is special interrogatories to the jury.”); Rakovich v.
Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1202 n.15 (7th Cir. 1988) (“In the unusual circumstance where an
immunity inquiry remains unresolved at the time the case goes to the jury, the district
court may consider the use of special interrogatories to allow the jury to resolve disputed
facts . . . .”), overruled on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941–42 (7th Cir.
2004).
39 See, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 208–11 & 211 n.12 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding
that “whether an officer made a reasonable mistake of law and is thus entitled to qualified
immunity is a question of law that is properly answered by the court, not a jury”); Willing-
ham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the district court should
submit factual questions to the jury and reserve for itself the legal question of whether the
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on the facts found by the jury”); accord Int’l
Ground Transp., Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Ocean City, 475 F.3d 214, 220 n.3 (4th
Cir. 2007); see also Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 563 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
judge is certainly not obliged to submit the ultimate issue [of qualified immunity] to the
jury.”); Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1318 (“[T]he jury does not apply the law relating to qualified
immunity to those historical facts it finds; that is the court’s duty.”).
40 See McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument that
the trial judge erred in submitting qualified immunity issue to the jury, and explaining
that, “while qualified immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial,
if the issue is not decided until trial the defense goes to the jury”).
41 See CHAMBERS OF THE HON. D. BROCK HORNBY, FIRST CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS FOR CASES OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH, EIGHTH, AND FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENTS 5, 7 n.8 (2011).
42 See, e.g., Kerman, 374 F.3d at 109.
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on qualified immunity, but like the First and Second Circuits, notes that
where historical facts are in dispute the jury should resolve those questions so
as to assist the court in making the legal determination as to whether quali-
fied immunity is appropriate.43  The Fourth Circuit, like the Second, does
not create pattern instructions, but has suggested that juries are not to decide
the legal question of qualified immunity but are limited to resolving disputes
of historical fact that bear on the defense.44
The Sixth Circuit has been less than clear about what role qualified
immunity can play at trial, but one recent district court decision, after
thoughtfully reviewing Sixth Circuit precedent, concluded that at most a jury
might be asked to resolve factual questions that bear on the defense.45  The
Seventh Circuit’s current pattern instructions contain no reference to quali-
fied immunity.46  Courts in the circuit have, however, approved of allowing
the jury to resolve disputed issues of fact that would permit the court to
resolve the legal entitlement to the defense.47
The Eighth Circuit has no specific instruction on qualified immunity,
but in the Eighth Amendment excessive force context specifically, the circuit
recommends that no instruction be given, on the theory that if the plaintiff
can establish facts that the defendant used force “maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm,”48 then the qualified immunity
defense is irrelevant.49  And Eighth Circuit caselaw directs lower courts to
limit juries to considering disputed facts that might be relevant to the immu-
nity defense.50
43 COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 4.7.2 (2017) [hereinaf-
ter THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
44 See Willingham, 412 F.3d at 560.  At the same time, the court appears to contemplate
that juries can be instructed on the legal issue of qualified immunity.  See, e.g., Int’l Ground
Transp., 475 F.3d at 219–20 (reviewing a case in which the jury was instructed on qualified
immunity, rendered a general verdict in favor of individual defendants but also found
municipality liable for constitutional violations; the court construed the verdict as finding
the individual defendants entitled to qualified immunity).
45 Wesley v. Rigney, No. 10-51, 2016 WL 853505, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 3, 2016), aff’d sub
nom. Wesley v. Campbell, 864 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2017).  On appeal of the district court’s
decision, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to instruct on
qualified immunity and seemed to approve of the line drawn between questions of fact and
questions of law. Campbell, 864 F.3d at 441–42.
46 See COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT (2017).
47 See, e.g., Castillo v. City of Chicago, No. 11 C 7359, 2012 WL 1658350, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
May 11, 2012).
48 This is the standard for establishing an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.
See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
320–21 (1986)).
49 COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 4.42 COMMITTEE COM-
MENTS (2017).
50 See Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 585 (8th Cir. 2004).
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The Ninth Circuit’s pattern instructions direct lower courts to only ask
juries to resolve disputed issues of fact relevant to qualified immunity, but
also make clear that not every case will require this of the jury.51  For exam-
ple, where, to find for the plaintiff, the jury would be required to believe facts
that would eliminate qualified immunity as a defense, a district court does
not abuse its discretion by declining to give special interrogatories.52
The Tenth Circuit does not have pattern instructions, but has approved
of instructing the jury on the qualified immunity defense, along these lines:
You are instructed that Defendant . . . cannot be held liable to Plaintiff
in the event that you determine he is entitled to qualified immunity for his
actions.  If you find, after considering all the evidence before you, that the
actions of defendant . . . were such that a reasonable person would have
believed them to be lawful and not violative of some established statutory or
constitutional right, which a reasonable person would have known, Defen-
dant . . . is entitled to qualified immunity.53
In general, however, the Tenth Circuit has held that it is inappropriate
to ask the jury to resolve the legal question of qualified immunity; instead,
the proper course is to ask the jury special interrogatories to determine the
existence of facts that bear on the qualified immunity defense.54  The court
also acknowledged that in rare circumstances a court could define the clearly
established law and then instruct the jury “to determine what the defendant
actually did and whether it was reasonable in light of the clearly established
law defined by the judge.”55  The Eleventh Circuit also has approved of using
special interrogatories where necessary to resolve factual issues relevant to
qualified immunity.56
Among all of these courts, however, little attention has been paid to allo-
cating burdens of proof and persuasion at trial.  The Third Circuit has placed
on defendants the burden of requesting and justifying the need for special
51 NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 9.34 (2018); see also Morales v. Fry,
873 F.3d 817, 819–26 (9th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases and summarizing Ninth Circuit’s
approach).
52 See, e.g., Hung Lam v. City of San Jose, 869 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give special interrogato-
ries where the trial court reasoned that if the jury believed the plaintiff’s version of the
facts, the defendant would not be entitled to qualified immunity).
53 Bass v. Pottawatomie Cty. Pub. Safety Ctr., 425 F. App’x 713, 718 (10th Cir. 2011).
54 See Gonzales v. Duran, 590 F.3d 855, 859–60 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Thus, the predicate
for submitting a qualified immunity question to the jury is the existence of disputed issues
of material fact—that is, the question of what actually happened.”).
55 Id. at 859.
56 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE U.S. ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL CASES 5.0 (2018); see also Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d
1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A tool used to apportion the jury and court functions relat-
ing to qualified immunity issues in cases that go to trial is special interrogatories to the
jury.”).
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interrogatories, but has not addressed the burden of proof.57  The Second
Circuit has assigned the burden of proof on qualified immunity to the defen-
dant.58  The Sixth Circuit has rejected the idea that interposition of a quali-
fied immunity defense imposes on a plaintiff the need to prove more than
she otherwise would have to prove to establish her constitutional claim, but
has not clarified what that means in terms of instructions as to burdens of
proof.59
The Fifth Circuit has, by contrast, indicated its acceptance of juries
deciding entitlement to qualified immunity beyond simply resolving facts,
and places on the plaintiff the burden of disproving the applicability of the
immunity.60  The Fifth Circuit’s pattern instruction provides as follows:
As to each claim for which Plaintiff [name] has proved each essential
element, you must consider whether Defendant [name] is entitled to what
the law calls “qualified immunity.”  Qualified immunity bars a defendant’s
liability even if [he/she] violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.  Qualified
immunity exists to give government officials breathing room to make reason-
able but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.  Qualified immu-
nity provides protection from liability for all but the plainly incompetent
government [officers/officials], or those who knowingly violate the law.  It is
Plaintiff [name]’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
qualified immunity does not apply in this case.
Qualified immunity applies if a reasonable [officer/ official] could have
believed that [specify the disputed act, such as the arrest or the search] was
lawful in light of clearly established law and the information Defendant
[name] possessed.  But Defendant [name] is not entitled to qualified immu-
nity if, at the time of [specify the disputed act], a reasonable [officer/offi-
cial] with the same information could not have believed that [his/her]
actions were lawful.  [Law enforcement officers/government officials] are
presumed to know the clearly established constitutional rights of individuals
they encounter.
In this case, the clearly established law at the time was that [specify what
constitutes the clearly established law.]
If, after considering the scope of discretion and responsibility generally
given to [specify type of officers/officials] in performing their duties and
57 See Velius v. Twp. of Hamilton, 466 F. App’x 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2012).  Although the
Third Circuit’s pattern jury instructions do not address the burden of proof on issues
related to qualified immunity, they do refer to qualified immunity as an affirmative defense
and in general terms require that defendants bear the burden of proof on affirmative
defenses. THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 1.10, 4.7.2.
58 See Johnson v. Perry, 859 F.3d 156, 170 (2d Cir. 2017) (stating that defendant has
burden of proof on qualified immunity at trial); Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 149
(2d Cir. 2012).
59 See Crutcher v. Kentucky, 883 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1989) (rejecting argument and
terming it a “deformity in civil rights law”).
60 This is consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s approach to qualified immunity when
resolving motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. See Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484,
490 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that at summary judgment a plaintiff must identify specific
evidence that shows that the defense is not available and recognizing that qualified immu-
nity alters the “usual” summary judgment allocations of burden).
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after considering all of the circumstances of this case as they would have
reasonably appeared to Defendant [name] at the time of the [specify dis-
puted act], you find that Plaintiff [name] failed to prove that no reasonable
[officer/official] could have believed that the [specify disputed act] was law-
ful, then Defendant [name] is entitled to qualified immunity, and your ver-
dict must be for Defendant [name] on those claims.  But if you find that
Defendant [name] violated Plaintiff [name]’s constitutional rights and that
Defendant [name] is not entitled to qualified immunity as to that claim,
then your verdict must be for Plaintiff [name] on that claim.61
Thus, for the most part, lower courts have little guidance, outside of the
Fifth Circuit, as to how to allocate burdens when instructing juries on issues
related to qualified immunity.  And in some circuits, it remains an open ques-
tion whether juries can be instructed at all on qualified immunity.  Of course,
it is up for grabs how important of a role the burden of persuasion plays in
civil cases.62  But doctrinally, the failure to properly allocate burdens of proof
in the civil context can be sufficient to justify reversal on appeal.63  This pre-
sumably reflects some judgment about the value of getting it right.  And for
determinations of historical fact, one might surmise that allocating burdens
of persuasion is particularly important.
D. Qualified Immunity at Trial: Academic Commentary
Alan Chen has identified the confusion that exists in qualified immunity
regarding the appropriate role for the jury “in assessing factual disputes
underlying the immunity inquiry.”64  Nonetheless, legal scholars have consid-
ered the role of qualified immunity at trial, identifying two principal ways it
could be raised: (1) by charging the jury on disputed factual questions; or (2)
by instructing the jury on the qualified immunity defense itself with a descrip-
tion of the clearly established law to be applied to the case.65  Most commen-
61 COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES ASS’N, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) 10.3 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
62 See Ravenell, supra note 11, at 179–84 (reviewing arguments but concluding that
allocating the burden of persuasion is important in the qualified immunity context).
63 See, e.g., In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(reversing for failure to properly allocate burden of persuasion); Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F.3d
278, 287 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing for using improper burden and standard of proof); cf.
Berger v. Compaq Comput. Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversing for
improper shift from plaintiff to defendant of burden of proof regarding element of Rule
23).
64 Chen, supra note 11, at 9.
65 See David J. Ignall, Making Sense of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and Issues for
the Trier of Fact, 30 CAL. W. L. REV. 201, 217 (1994) (proposing bifurcating trial with jury
determining factual issues relevant to qualified immunity first); David Rudovsky, The Quali-
fied Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional
Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 72–73 (1989) (arguing that instructing the jury to apply
clearly established law is fraught and instead arguing that juries should be limited to mak-
ing findings of fact through special interrogatories); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 546–47
(2001) (discussing first two options); Struve, supra note 8, at 712–13 (2006) (discussing
special interrogatories); Henk J. Brands, Note, Qualified Immunity and the Allocation of Deci-
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tators take the view that of these two options, the first is preferable.66  Karen
Blum has argued forcefully in favor of only permitting juries to resolve quali-
fied immunity through special interrogatories directed to disputed questions
of fact.67  Chen has argued that, to the extent that qualified immunity is a
pure question of law, it does not belong in the jury’s hands, even as he
acknowledges that the Court has expressed ambivalence on this question.68
But where a qualified immunity defense depends on disputed facts, allocat-
ing the burdens of proof and persuasion is necessary to resolve the defense.69
And Catherine Struve has argued that juries should not be tasked with
answering whether a defendant behaved reasonably while also unreasonably
violating the Fourth Amendment, but instead should only be asked to deter-
mine questions of historical fact that might be relevant to determining
whether qualified immunity is available to a defendant.70  But neither Struve,
Chen, nor Blum dig deep into the issue of instructing a jury on qualified
immunity, how to do it, or how to allocate burdens in such a case.
As Teresa Ravenell has argued, assigning evidentiary burdens in the con-
text of law-based qualified immunity claims may make little sense, and has
been at least implicitly disapproved by the Supreme Court in Elder v. Hollo-
way.71  But by the time the case reaches trial, law-based qualified immunity
sion-Making Functions Between Judge and Jury, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1065 (1990) (arguing
that judges should consider identifying “clearly established” law, instructing juries as to its
content, and asking juries to resolve whether qualified immunity is appropriate).
66 The risk of instructing the jury on the full qualified immunity defense was identified
by Second Circuit Judge Jon Newman: jurors will tend to give the benefit of the doubt to
officers because of their presumption that the officer subjectively believed he was following
the law, even though jurors may be instructed that they are not to consider an officer’s
subjective state of mind when resolving the defense. Federal Response to Police Misconduct:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong. 34 (1992) (statement of Jon O. Newman, J., United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit).  Along similar lines, Sheldon Nahmod has expressed concern about
how qualified immunity creates empathy among judges for defendants, marginalizing the
plaintiff’s counternarrative.  Sheldon Nahmod, The Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy in
Section 1983 Cases, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 819, 821 (1997).
67 See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User’s Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 209
(1993); Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A Practical Application of
§ 1983 as It Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21 TOURO L. REV. 571, 589
(2005); Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 940–41 (2015) (arguing in favor of special interrogatories and
against judges resolving disputed factual questions on qualified immunity through sum-
mary judgment).  Blum has even gone so far as to argue that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), might make jury instruction on excessive force
unnecessary, with juries only required to decide factual questions that would then enable a
court to decide the question of qualified immunity.  Karen M. Blum, Scott v. Harris: Death
Knell for Deadly Force Policies and Garner Jury Instructions?, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 45, 72 (2007).
68 See Chen, supra note 11, at 75.
69 See id. at 95.
70 Struve, supra note 8, at 712–13.
71 Ravenell, supra note 11, at 167–84 (citing Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515
(1994)).
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claims should be resolved, except to the extent they depend on disputed
facts.  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s focus has been almost exclusively on how
lower courts resolve qualified immunity prior to trial.72  For fact-based quali-
fied immunity defenses, however, assigning evidentiary burdens may be sensi-
ble—after all, the defense depends on the defendant’s reasonable
perception of the facts available to him at the time of the alleged constitu-
tional violation, a question that can be resolved at least in part through fact-
finding.73  And there are compelling arguments for assigning those burdens
to the defendant.
First, as others have noted, the burden of proof generally is allocated
according to who has the burden of pleading.74  And the Supreme Court has
made clear that plaintiffs do not bear any burden to anticipate qualified
immunity by seeking to overcome it through pleading.75  But this is tem-
pered by the fact that the Court has routinely spoken of the plaintiff’s bur-
den to “overcome” the defense of qualified immunity.76  But putting aside
the general rule regarding allocation of burdens, because the fact-based qual-
ified immunity defense depends on facts known to the defendant at the time
of the alleged violation, establishing those facts would seem to lie most natu-
rally at the feet of the defendant.77  And finally, as Alan Chen has argued,
placing the burden on plaintiffs would amount to adding an additional ele-
ment to a plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, beyond which the Court has said are
the required elements a plaintiff must prove.78
Of course, one must be cautious about allocating the burden to the
defendant—if the defendant has the burden of proving a set of facts that
overlaps entirely with the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, then one might reasonably
worry that instructing that the defendant has the burden of proof would
functionally put the burden on the defendant to convince a jury that the
plaintiff’s story is not true.79  Indeed, no matter what regime one chooses, it
might be a recipe for jury confusion.80
72 See supra Section I.B.
73 Ravenell, supra note 11, at 171–72.
74 Id. at 173.
75 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640–41 (1980).  It is noteworthy that Justice
Rehnquist stated that he read the majority opinion as addressing only the burden of plead-
ing and not the burden of proof. Id. at 642 (Rehnquist, J.).
76 Ravenell, supra note 11, at 175 (discussing cases).
77 Id. at 177–79.
78 See Chen, supra note 11, at 96–97 (“[A]ssignment of the burden of persuasion to
the plaintiff would have serious legal ramifications.  It is at least clear that assigning the
burden to the plaintiff would mean that she must prove more than she would in order to
prevail on the merits.”).
79 Id. at 97.
80 Id. at 98.  Rachel Harmon has suggested that jury instructions in qualified immunity
excessive force cases provide “little help in shaping a determination about excessiveness,”
but her claim does not seem rooted in empirical study.  Rather, it reviews model jury
instructions for the courts of appeals.  Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1144–45 (2008).
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II. METHODOLOGY
It has long been assumed that qualified immunity plays a substantial role
in the inability of many civil rights plaintiffs to prevail against government
officials, but there is little empirical support for that proposition.81  To the
extent that the assumption has been grounded in empirics, studies have
focused on data from decisions reported on electronic databases such as
Westlaw,82 which may not provide a representative sample of relevant cases.83
But data from a wider range of cases have not suggested that qualified immu-
nity plays a substantial role in the resolution of civil rights claims.84
This study is devoted to a related question: the role that qualified immu-
nity plays in resolving cases tried to a jury.  Arguably, the jury has a particu-
larly important role in civil rights cases, given its historical role as serving as a
bulwark against governmental overreaching.85  But, as with scholarly com-
mentary on qualified immunity in general, many academics assume that
juries will be hesitant to award damages against governmental officials, in
part because of defenses like qualified immunity.86  This is despite the
absence of any reliable empirical data on the question.  Notably, Joanna
Schwartz’s study of the role of qualified immunity in cases involving law
enforcement officers, while comprehensive and informative, did not study
the role qualified immunity played at trial or in jury instructions.87
81 See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS, at xx, 100 (1983) (arguing for expanded governmental liability in lieu of individ-
ual liability, because the immunity doctrine is unpredictable, does not deter, and often
leaves victims without compensation).
82 See, e.g., Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123,
136 n.65, 145 n.106 (1999) (finding that qualified immunity defenses were denied in only
twenty percent of federal cases over a two-year period, but citing only reported cases).
83 See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV.
2117, 2121 n.20 (2015) (discussing potential selection bias in Westlaw- and LEXIS-based
studies and reviewing literature).
84 Reinert, supra note 5; Schwartz, supra note 2.
85 Struve, supra note 8, at 706–07 (arguing that “a jury finding of liability in a civil
rights case serves as a more effective pronouncement than a judge’s disposition would,
because it can be seen as embodying the judgment of representatives of the community”);
Michael L. Wells, Scott v. Harris and the Role of the Jury in Constitutional Litigation, 29 REV.
LITIG. 65, 87–88 (2009) (reviewing literature supporting “democratic value of jury decision
making” in § 1983 litigation).
86 Diana Hassel, A Missed Opportunity: The Federal Tort Claims Act and Civil Rights Actions,
49 OKLA. L. REV. 455, 475 (1996) (describing resistance of courts and jurors to awarding
damages against individual federal employees); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 546–47 (describ-
ing defense as “potent” and claiming that “[a] very large percentage of Section 1983 cases
get resolved in favor of the defendants based upon qualified immunity”); Christopher
Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 385
(identifying fear of reprisals, expense of litigation, effectiveness of good faith defenses,
“unsympathetic nature of many plaintiffs,” and juries’ biases as reasons that civil enforce-
ment of Fourth Amendment in general is unsuccessful).
87 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 30 n.85.
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To determine how qualified immunity is raised and resolved at trial, I
sought to identify federal civil rights cases that met the following conditions:
(1) qualified immunity was raised at some point during the proceedings; (2)
jury instructions were proposed or adopted; and (3) a jury trial occurred.88  I
limited my search to civil rights cases litigated over a three-year period
between January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2015.89
My initial search identified cases that settled shortly before or after trial,
as well as cases resolved on summary judgment prior to trial.  For the pur-
poses of completeness, I included these cases in my initial data collection, but
my analysis in this paper focuses on cases that went to trial in some form.
I coded each case for the following variables: (1) district of origin; (2)
circuit of origin; (3) filing date; (4) termination date; (5) whether court-
adopted jury instructions were available; (6) whether only party-proposed
jury instructions were available; (7) whether a trial occurred; (8) case out-
come; (9) jury award, if applicable; (10) whether proposed or adopted jury
instructions included language regarding qualified immunity;90 (11)
whether special interrogatories were used at trial; and (12) whether the bur-
den of persuasion on issues related to qualified immunity were addressed in
the jury instructions.  Where necessary, I consulted trial transcripts to estab-
lish the content of instructions provided to the jury.
Because this study is related to resolution of qualified immunity issues by
juries, it does not include data on how post-trial motions as a matter of law
were resolved, although my impression from the data is that judges generally
denied those motions, whether brought by plaintiffs or defendants.  Simi-
larly, very few motions for new trial were granted, but where a new trial
occurred, I coded the most recent trial.
III. RESULTS
A. Fundamental Case Characteristics
I identified 287 unique cases in which qualified immunity was raised,
jury instructions were proposed or adopted, and the case was resolved shortly
prior to or through a jury trial.  Of these cases, 211 proceeded to a jury trial
88 I identified cases through Bloomberg Law, conducting a broad docket search for
cases that included the following terms in either documents or docket entry: “qualified
immunity,” “verdict,” and “jury instructions.”  Bloomberg Law, unlike Westlaw or LEXIS,
contains the full docket and decisions of all civil cases in the federal system.
89 To limit the cohort to civil rights cases, I relied on case coding by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, searching for cases that were coded as civil rights or
prisoners’ rights cases, including employment discrimination cases (AO Codes 440, 442,
550, and 555). ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL NATURE OF SUIT CODE DESCRIP-
TIONS 3, 4 (June 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/js_044_code_descrip
tions.pdf.
90 I also coded for instructions that used the term “arguable” probable cause, because
it is a stand-in for qualified immunity in some Fourth Amendment contexts. See, e.g., Gates
v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018); Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338,
354 (2d Cir. 2017).
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that resulted in a final judgment; the remainder were resolved through settle-
ment, summary judgment, or remain unresolved.91  The median time from
filing to resolution of all cases was over two years (903 days); for cases that
proceeded to trial, the median time for resolution was basically identical (900
days).92  This was slightly longer than the median time from filing to trial in
all federal civil cases over the same time period.93  This is unsurprising,
because one would assume that cases involving qualified immunity would
take longer to resolve, given the opportunity for motion practice and inter-
locutory appeal.94
Of the cases that went to trial, the plaintiff prevailed in slightly over
twenty-five percent of the cases, the defendant prevailed in almost seventy
percent of the cases, and the remainder settled or were disposed of in other
manners.  This is comparable to success rates that have been reported in civil
rights cases overall.95
The vast majority of cases in the cohort involved Fourth Amendment
claims brought against law enforcement officers—claims of unreasonable
searches and seizures and excessive force amounted to about sixty-five per-
cent of the cohort.  Approximately ten percent of the cases involved First
Amendment claims, and another ten percent involved Eighth Amendment
claims brought by people in prison.  The remaining fifteen percent of the
cohort was a mix of discrimination, procedural due process, and substantive
due process claims.
Finally, there was a wide range of representation of the district courts, as
reflected in their circuit of origin.  The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits were overrepresented in the sample—cases from the Sec-
ond Circuit accounted for a little more than twenty percent of the cohort,
cases from the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits each made up about ten
percent, and the Ninth Circuit accounted for almost one quarter of the cases
91 In a handful of cases, there was no unanimous jury verdict, thus requiring a retrial.
92 The average time from filing to resolution of all cases was almost two years (916
days).  For cases that proceeded to trial, the average time for resolution was nearly identi-
cal (919 days).
93 See Federal Court Management Statistics—Profiles, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
(Dec. 31, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_dist
profile1231.2017.pdf (providing median disposition times for 2013, 2014, and 2015 of 26.5,
26.3, and 27.2 months, respectively).
94 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 129–30 (2009) (reporting
28.47% win rate for plaintiffs going to trial in employment discrimination cases, although
rate rises to 37.63% in jury trials); Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes
in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1578 n.57 (1989) (reporting plaintiff
trial success rate of 27.4% in nonprisoner civil rights cases); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Liti-
gation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1592 (2003) (reporting that plaintiffs prevailed in about
10% of trials in prisoners’ rights claims).
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in the cohort.  This is likely consistent with the heavier caseload, and the civil
rights caseload in particular, that characterizes these circuits.96
B. Overall Rates of Instruction on Qualified Immunity
Of the cases in the cohort, an instruction on qualified immunity was
proposed or adopted in sixty cases,97 with no instruction on the immunity
proposed or adopted in 223 cases.  Special interrogatories were proposed or
adopted in thirty-two cases.  In six cases, both special interrogatories and an
instruction on qualified immunity were proposed or adopted.  Table 1 sum-
marizes these data:
TABLE 1. OVERALL RATES OF INSTRUCTION, ALL CASES
Instruction Cases in which instruction  
was proposed or adopted 
No QI instruction, no special interrogatories 199 (70.3%) 
QI instruction and special interrogatories 6 (2.1%) 
QI instruction, no special interrogatories 54 (19.1%) 
Special interrogatories, no QI instruction 24 (8.5%) 
Total cases 287 
As discussed, however, not all of these cases involved trials, nor were they
all cases in which there is an available record of a court-approved instruc-
tion.98  When one limits the dataset to the cases involving jury trials, there
were 211 cases in which jury trials were held, 168 of which clearly identified
court-approved instructions.  In the remaining forty-three cases, the parties
proposed instructions but the court’s instructions were not in the record.
Among all cases, there were nineteen cases in which qualified immunity
instructions were approved by the court and an additional twelve cases in
which they were proposed.  Even assuming that instructions were given in
every case in which they were proposed, this would amount to approximately
fifteen percent of cases.  Table 2 more fully explores these data.
96 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts provides annual data that
describes case filings by subject matter.  District Courts in the Second, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits consistently report high caseloads with a significant number
of civil rights cases. See, e.g., Table C-3, U.S. District Courts—Civil Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics/table/c-3/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2017/03/31.
97 This includes three instances in which an arguable probable cause instruction was
requested or provided.
98 In some cases, although a qualified immunity instruction was proposed, the record
does not indicate whether the instruction was given by the trial judge.
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TABLE 2. INSTRUCTIONS PROPOSED AND APPROVED





No QI instruction, no  
special interrogatories 
136 (80.9%) 19 (47.5%) 155 (74.5%) 
QI instruction and  
special interrogatories 
1 (0.6%) 3 (7.5%) 4 (1.9%) 
QI instruction, no  
special interrogatories 
18 (10.7%) 9 (22.5%) 27 (13.0%) 
Special interrogatories,  
no QI instruction 
13 (7.7%) 9 (22.5%) 22 (10.6%) 
Total cases 168 40 20899 
In sum, whether limited to all cases or only those involving trials, in the
vast majority of instances, courts rarely instructed on qualified immunity or
on special interrogatories.  Juries were typically not asked to make any find-
ings that bear on qualified immunity.
C. Qualified Immunity by Case Type
As discussed above, the cohort of cases studied here consisted principally
of Fourth Amendment challenges to law enforcement conduct.  Case type
appeared to have some correlation with rates of instruction on qualified
immunity, as well as rates at which special interrogatories were requested or
adopted.  As Table 3 shows, among cases that went to trial, cases involving
different kinds of constitutional claims were associated with different rates of
instruction on qualified immunity.  Interestingly, cases involving Fourth
Amendment challenges were significantly more likely to involve requests for
special interrogatories.
TABLE 3. INSTRUCTIONS PROPOSED AND/OR APPROVED, BY CASE TYPE
(CASES LITIGATED TO TRIAL)




Fourth Amendment Claims 19 (13.9%) 25 (18.25%) 
First Amendment Claims 2 (9.1%) 2 (9.1%) 
Eighth Amendment Claims 6 (21.4%) 1 (3.6%) 
Other 3 (13.6%) 0 (0%) 
The results do not change dramatically when one examines only cases in
which a court-approved instruction could be located—the only significant
99 There were three cases in which a trial occurred but in which data regarding the
presence or absence of qualified immunity instructions could not be determined.
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change is that the rate of instruction on qualified immunity in Eighth
Amendment claims decreases to about 12.5% of the cohort.  The significant
variation in the use of special interrogatories remains, however, with special
interrogatories much more likely to be requested and approved in cases
involving Fourth Amendment claims.
D. Qualified Immunity Instruction by Circuit of Origin
Because each circuit has different approaches to qualified immunity,100
understanding whether the prevalence of qualified immunity instructions is
related to circuit of origin is important.  One should expect, for example,
that cases in the Fifth Circuit, where model jury instructions explicitly
approve of qualified immunity instructions,101 would be more likely to have
trials in which instructions on qualified immunity are routinely provided.
Table 4 provides these data for all circuits in the cohort:
TABLE 4. PROPOSED AND COURT-ADOPTED INSTRUCTIONS ON QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY, BY CIRCUIT, ALL CASES LITIGATED TO TRIAL
Circuit No QI, no  
special  
interrogatories 







First 4 1 2 7 
Second 26 4 14 44 
Third 6 3 1 10 
Fourth 2 2 0 4 
Fifth 7 15 0 22 
Sixth 6 1 0 7 
Seventh 21 0 0 21 
Eighth 8 0 0 8 
Ninth 46 2 3 51 
Tenth 12 1 1 14 
Eleventh 17 2 0 19 
D.C. 0 0 1 1 
When one limits the data to cases in which it could be confirmed that
the court adopted qualified immunity instructions, the incidence rates
reduce: in the Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, each had only
one such case; in the Fifth Circuit, there were thirteen cases identified; and
the Ninth Circuit had two such cases.102  These results are striking for at least
100 See supra Section I.C.
101 See COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 61.
102 In the remainder of the circuits, there were no cases in which a court-approved
instruction on qualified immunity was confirmed.
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two reasons.  First, although every circuit but the Fifth expresses doubt about
instructing juries on the substance of the qualified immunity defense,103 the
Fifth Circuit is not the only jurisdiction in which qualified immunity instruc-
tions were proposed and adopted.  Second, although most circuits express
openness toward resolving disputed factual questions related to qualified
immunity through special interrogatories, many circuits do not do so in
practice.
E. Instructions on Burden of Proof/Persuasion
Among the cases in which the jury was instructed as to qualified immu-
nity or the jury was asked to answer special interrogatories geared toward
assisting the trial court in resolving qualified immunity, each instruction was
coded for whether the burden of proof was placed on the plaintiff, the defen-
dant, or unspecified.  Given that the burden of proof generally falls upon the
plaintiff, it might be assumed that where the jury instructions did not identify
the party that bears the burden of proof, juries assumed that it fell on the
plaintiff.104  Table 5 describes how the burden of proof was allocated, if at all,
in the fifty-three cases in which a qualified immunity instruction and/or spe-
cial interrogatories were adopted or proposed.
TABLE 5. BURDEN OF PROOF, INSTRUCTIONS ADOPTED OR PROPOSED






QI, No Special Interrogatories 3 15 9 
Special Interrogatories, No QI 2 0 20 
QI and Special Interrogatories 1 1 2 
Total 6 16 31 
Once again, there also is a large variation among the circuits.  The Fifth
Circuit accounts for thirteen of the sixteen cases in which the burden was
explicitly placed on the plaintiff.  Yet the Second Circuit, which has explicitly
held that the burden of proof for qualified immunity rests with defend-
ants,105 accounted for sixteen cases in which the burden of proof in the
instructions was unspecified.
F. Outcome and Qualified Immunity Instructions
Finally, as there is a longstanding assumption in the literature that quali-
fied immunity, when raised at trial, operates as a substantial barrier to suc-
103 See supra Section I.C.
104 Cf. Bradshaw v. Heckler, 810 F.2d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 1987) (“We have held consist-
ently that where the Secretary fails to acknowledge the burden of proof one way or
another, it must be assumed that the burden improperly remained on the claimant.”).
105 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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cess, outcomes at trial were coded and sorted according to whether a
qualified immunity instruction and/or special interrogatories were included
in the jury instructions.  Table 6 shows that, when considering all cases that
went to trial, the presence of a qualified immunity instruction, but not a spe-
cial interrogatory, is associated with a decreased plaintiff success rate.
TABLE 6. CASE OUTCOME, BY JURY INSTRUCTION





or After Trial 
QI, With or Without Special 
Interrogatories 
22 (78.4%) 4 (14.3%) 2 (7.2%) 
Special Interrogatories, No QI 11 (50%) 11 (50%) 0 (0%) 
No QI, No special interrogatories 111 (73%) 39 (25.6%) 2 (1.3%) 
Total 144 (71.3%) 54 (26.7%) 4 (2%) 
Table 7 focuses only on cases in which a court-approved instruction was
confirmed, and suggests an even stronger association between a decreased
plaintiff success rate and the presence of a qualified immunity instruction.
TABLE 7. CASE OUTCOME, BY JURY INSTRUCTION, COURT-APPROVED
INSTRUCTIONS ONLY





or After Trial 
QI, With or Without Special 
Interrogatories 
15 (88.2%) 2 (11.8%) 0 (0%) 
Special Interrogatories, No QI 5 (38.5%) 8 (61.5%) 0 (0%) 
No QI, No Special Interrogatories 95 (71.4%) 37 (27.8%) 1 (0.8%%) 
Total 115 (74.1%) 39 (25.2%) 1 (0.7%) 
There is an even stronger association with success when one considers
only the presence or absence of a qualified immunity instruction.  Of the 162
cases in which there was a trial and in which the presence or absence of a
qualified immunity instruction could be confirmed, the plaintiff prevailed in
approximately eleven percent of cases in which a qualified immunity instruc-
tion was given, compared to thirty-one percent of cases in which a qualified
immunity instruction was not provided.  In other words, the presence of a
qualified immunity instruction is associated with a plaintiff’s success rate that
is about one third that of cases in which no such instruction was given.
This relationship is even more suggestive when one considers only cases
involving Fourth Amendment claims.  In Fourth Amendment cases where no
qualified immunity instruction was given, the plaintiff prevailed about thirty-
three percent of the time (30 out of 89 trials).  The plaintiff prevailed only
about nine percent of the time (1 out of 11 trials) where a qualified immu-
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nity instruction was given.  There was no similar relationship in Fourth
Amendment cases based on the presence or absence of special interrogato-
ries—where no interrogatories were given, there was a plaintiff verdict about
twenty-five percent of the time, as compared to a fifty-eight percent win rate
for plaintiffs when special interrogatories were submitted.
Finally, if one focuses instead on cases in which court-adopted instruc-
tions allocate burdens of proof, the potential relationship with case outcome
is stark.  Table 8 shows that there were no cases in which plaintiffs succeeded
at trial where a court-adopted instruction placed the burden of proof explic-
itly on the plaintiff to rebut qualified immunity.  In other words, the only
cases in which a plaintiff prevailed at trial where there were court-adopted
instructions on qualified immunity or special interrogatories are those cases
in which the court gave no instructions on who carried the burden of
persuasion.
TABLE 8. CASE OUTCOME BY ALLOCATION OF BURDEN OF PROOF,
COURT-APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS
Party with Burden of Proof Defendant Verdict Plaintiff Verdict 
Defendant 2 0 
Plaintiff 12 0 
Unspecified 6 11 
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The first major implication from these data is that, consistent with what
empirical research has suggested about other aspects of qualified immunity,
the impact of the defense at trial does not appear consistent with what has
been the scholarly assumption.  Qualified immunity has been described as a
potent defense at trial, with many commentators assuming that the presence
of the defense makes it that much harder for plaintiffs to achieve success at
trial.106  Moreover, commentators have also assumed that juries will play a
significant role in assessing disputed issues of fact that relate to the qualified
immunity defense.
The data presented here suggest that, in fact, qualified immunity rarely
plays a significant role in jury trials.  Instructions on qualified immunity and/
or special interrogatories were proposed or adopted in fewer than a quarter
of cases that resulted in a jury trial.  If one looks to cases in which only a
court-approved instruction could be confirmed, only about ten percent of
cases were located with instructions on qualified immunity, with an addi-
tional approximately seven percent of cases found in which special interroga-
tories alone were given to the jury.107
The overall picture this paints is one in which qualified immunity rarely,
if ever, plays a role in jury trials of civil rights claims.  At the same time, it is
106 See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
107 See supra Table 2.
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apparent that the role of qualified immunity varies significantly according to
circuit of origin.  The Fifth Circuit lies at one extreme, in which juries were
instructed on qualified immunity (with and without special interrogatories)
well over half of the time (in eleven out of sixteen trials for which court-
approved instructions were available).  In the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, there were no trials in which juries were
instructed on qualified immunity or special interrogatories.  Qualified immu-
nity instructions were extremely rare in the Second and Ninth Circuits as
well—in the Second Circuit, instructions on qualified immunity were given in
one out of twenty cases, while in the Ninth Circuit, qualified immunity
instructions were provided in two out of forty-two cases.108
The distinct experience in the Fifth Circuit should not be surprising,
given that the Fifth Circuit is the only court, with its model jury instructions,
to explicitly approve of instructing the jury on the qualified immunity
defense.109  More surprising perhaps is that in other circuits, which disap-
prove of qualified immunity instructions but embrace the concept of special
interrogatories, special interrogatories are rarely, if ever, used.
There are some possible explanations for this, all of which would require
further research to evaluate.  First, it may be that in the run of cases, trial
judges consider the facts central to a plaintiff’s claim to overlap so closely
with the facts relevant to qualified immunity that submitting special interrog-
atories to juries is considered duplicative or potentially confusing.  In these
cases, judges may simply be disregarding the Supreme Court’s admonition
that there is such a thing as a “reasonably unreasonable” officer.110  Indeed,
it may be that lower courts are acting consistently with the views espoused by
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment in Saucier, when she declared
that, where summary judgment on qualified immunity is inappropriate, the
jury’s resolution of the merits of a Fourth Amendment violation will necessa-
rily resolve any claim to qualified immunity.111
Second, it may be that lower courts are treating qualified immunity
“solely” as an immunity from suit, and not as a defense to liability.  On this
theory, courts may conclude that, having rejected qualified immunity argu-
ments at earlier stages of the case (summary judgment or in motions to dis-
108 In both the Second and Ninth Circuits, juries were occasionally given special inter-
rogatories but not qualified immunity instructions—in four out of twenty cases in the Sec-
ond Circuit and in two out of forty-two trials in the Ninth Circuit.
109 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
110 In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987), for example, the Court rejected
the argument that “[i]t is not possible . . . to say that one ‘reasonably’ acted unreasonably.”
The Court confirmed this understanding in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203 (2001), rev’d
on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).  Even in the Eighth Amendment
context, in which some appellate courts have suggested that Saucier may be less relevant,
the Court has suggested that the qualified immunity inquiry may be different from the
merits, because after the Court decided that the prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment
claim, it proceeded to consider whether the defendants acted reasonably under the cir-
cumstances. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741–46 (2002).
111 See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment).
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miss), once trial has commenced, there is no role for the defense to play.
Again, however, this would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s gui-
dance to lower courts.112
Third, lower courts may just conclude that it is simply too confusing to
instruct juries on qualified immunity or special interrogatories.113  Consider
the following language from one of the rare cases in which a court approved
a qualified immunity instruction:
It is McFarland’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
qualified immunity does not apply in this case. . . . If, after considering the
scope of discretion and responsibility generally given to corrections officers
in performing their duties and after considering all of the circumstances of
this case as they would have reasonably appeared to the defendant at the
time the defendant supervised McFarland at the poultry farm, you find that
McFarland failed to prove that no reasonable officer could have believed
that McFarland’s work at the poultry farm was lawful, then the defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity, and your verdict must be for the defendant
on those claims.114
The jury found for the defendant in the case, although it did not appear
to base its decision on a resolution of the qualified immunity defense.115
Nonetheless, had the jury been required to decide whether the plaintiff
“failed to prove that no reasonable officer could have believed” that defen-
dant behaved lawfully, one might anticipate the likelihood of jury confusion.
Finally, it may be that defense counsel are simply making the strategic
decision not to request instructions on qualified immunity or special inter-
rogatories.  There are examples in the dataset in which a court invites
defendants to submit special interrogatories, and the defense counsel decline
to propose them.  Defense counsel may be concerned about jury confusion.
In jurisdictions which would allocate the burden of proof to the defense,
defense counsel may be leery of distracting the jury from what might be effec-
tive arguments about plaintiff’s failure to prove her case.  Or, defense coun-
sel may adhere to an entrenched practice that has not been displaced by
doctrinal openings.  In the Second Circuit, for example, the City of New York
routinely proposes that special interrogatories be given to the jury, but other
institutional defendants do not appear to have that practice.116
In other words, despite the Supreme Court’s enthusiasm for qualified
immunity, other relevant actors who operationalize Supreme Court doctrine
112 The Court has stated as far back as Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), that
qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” but it
has never suggested that, as a result it, is unavailable at trial.
113 Cf. supra Sections I.B, I.C.
114 See Jury Instruction C-4, McFarland v. Brooks, No. 4:14-cv-00090, 2016 WL 1091096
(N.D. Miss. Jan. 18, 2017).
115 The verdict form in McFarland indicates that the jury found that the plaintiff did not
establish the defendant’s deliberate indifference.  Verdict Form at 1, McFarland, 2016 WL
1091096.  The jury did not proceed to answer whether the defendant was entitled to quali-
fied immunity. Id.
116 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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may not share that enthusiasm, for a variety of reasons.  This is not inconsis-
tent with empirical observations that have been made about how qualified
immunity operates outside of the trial context—it is more rarely invoked
than one would expect given the trends in Supreme Court doctrine and the
perceived strength of the defense.117
There is also something to be learned, however, from those cases in
which the defense is raised at trial, either through instructions or special
interrogatories.  First, despite the attention that scholars and appellate courts
have paid to the question of burdens of proof and persuasion, jury instruc-
tions on qualified immunity are far from uniform in allocating burdens.  In
most cases, no burden at all is specified.118  And where a burden is specified,
it is usually placed on the plaintiff.  Although there is good reason to believe
that, to the extent fact-based qualified immunity defenses are being raised,
the burden of proof and persuasion should be placed on the defendant,119
this is rarely the case at trial.120
At the same time, when juries are instructed on qualified immunity (or
given special interrogatories), plaintiffs are more likely to lose at trial.
Indeed, plaintiffs never prevailed at trial in cases in which a qualified immu-
nity instruction was given and the burden was explicitly placed on the plain-
tiff (though one should be cautious about drawing too much in conclusion
from this, for the total number of cases is small).  This would seem to suggest
that the qualified immunity defense may have some impact on trial outcome,
although caution is in order.
Most importantly, it is not obvious from reviewing verdicts that juries are
ultimately resting their decision on qualified immunity.  In many cases, they
simply are finding no constitutional violation and therefore never even turn-
ing to questions of qualified immunity.  Perhaps, as others have suggested,121
just being instructed on the defense makes juries more likely to find defen-
dant’s conduct reasonable or lawful, but one would want to explore out-
comes further to confirm this result.
CONCLUSION
This is the first empirical study to investigate the role that qualified
immunity plays in jury trials.  It shows that, on one hand, qualified immunity
rarely is the subject of jury deliberations but that, on the other hand, when it
117 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 2.
118 See supra Table 4.
119 See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
120 The Supreme Court has recently given strong indications that, at least at trial, the
burden of proving the defense rests on defendants.  Notably, in Ortiz v. Jordan, one of the
few cases in which the Court reviewed a qualified immunity trial, when discussing the
officers’ entitlement to immunity, the Court noted that the defendants “produced no evi-
dence” for one of their factual contentions, suggesting that at least at trial, the burden of
proof rests on defendants invoking the qualified immunity defense.  562 U.S. 180, 191 n.9
(2011).
121 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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is, it appears to have an outward impact on outcomes.  Both findings raise
significant questions about how qualified immunity operates on the ground.
The general infrequency with which the defense is raised suggests that courts
and litigants do not see the defense as typically appropriate for jury resolu-
tion.  The potential impact that it may have on outcomes, however, suggests
that in those cases where it is deemed appropriate, it can be outcome
determinative.
